~ruther/guix-local

5e764e2b6f2357aac9dae3c8921e24c43ed8f2ba — Mark H Weaver 10 years ago 4efc8eb
gnu: linux-libre: Update to 4.4.1.

* gnu/packages/patches/linux-libre-CVE-2016-0728.patch: Delete file.
* gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Remove it.
* gnu/packages/linux.scm (linux-libre): Update to 4.4.1.
  [source]: Remove patch.
3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)

M gnu-system.am
M gnu/packages/linux.scm
D gnu/packages/patches/linux-libre-CVE-2016-0728.patch
M gnu-system.am => gnu-system.am +0 -1
@@ 589,7 589,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA =						\
  gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-4695.patch		\
  gnu/packages/patches/libwmf-CVE-2015-4696.patch		\
  gnu/packages/patches/libxslt-CVE-2015-7995.patch		\
  gnu/packages/patches/linux-libre-CVE-2016-0728.patch		\
  gnu/packages/patches/lirc-localstatedir.patch			\
  gnu/packages/patches/libpthread-glibc-preparation.patch	\
  gnu/packages/patches/lm-sensors-hwmon-attrs.patch		\

M gnu/packages/linux.scm => gnu/packages/linux.scm +2 -4
@@ 212,7 212,7 @@ for SYSTEM, or #f if there is no configuration for SYSTEM."
     #f)))

(define-public linux-libre
  (let* ((version "4.4")
  (let* ((version "4.4.1")
         (build-phase
          '(lambda* (#:key system inputs #:allow-other-keys #:rest args)
             ;; Apply the neat patch.


@@ 286,9 286,7 @@ for SYSTEM, or #f if there is no configuration for SYSTEM."
             (uri (linux-libre-urls version))
             (sha256
              (base32
               "1839xsaifs7vvyblzin8jps0gqi10xmz1l9p4x0j27vmdj39jgpm"))
             (patches
              (list (search-patch "linux-libre-CVE-2016-0728.patch")))))
               "1d6wzhbpz0g79iwlkv10qmig518risz9bi3qw8wdn7j2xs7ij1j2"))))
    (build-system gnu-build-system)
    (supported-systems '("x86_64-linux" "i686-linux"))
    (native-inputs `(("perl" ,perl)

D gnu/packages/patches/linux-libre-CVE-2016-0728.patch => gnu/packages/patches/linux-libre-CVE-2016-0728.patch +0 -84
@@ 1,84 0,0 @@
Copied from
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/patch/?id=23567fd052a9abb6d67fe8e7a9ccdd9800a540f2

From 23567fd052a9abb6d67fe8e7a9ccdd9800a540f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:09:04 +0000
Subject: KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()

This fixes CVE-2016-0728.

If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.

This can be tested with the following program:

	#include <stddef.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <keyutils.h>

	int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
	{
		int i = 0;
		key_serial_t serial;

		serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
				"leaked-keyring");
		if (serial < 0) {
			perror("keyctl");
			return -1;
		}

		if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
			   KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
			perror("keyctl");
			return -1;
		}

		for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
			serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
					"leaked-keyring");
			if (serial < 0) {
				perror("keyctl");
				return -1;
			}
		}

		return 0;
	}

If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:

3f3d898f I--Q---   100 perm 3f3f0000     0     0 keyring   leaked-keyring: empty

with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning.  If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.

Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
 security/keys/process_keys.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index a3f85d2..e6d50172 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -794,6 +794,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
 		goto error2;
 	} else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
+		key_put(keyring);
 		ret = 0;
 		goto error2;
 	}
-- 
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