~ruther/guix-local

2de7d137b3c6f528acb540a6ab3460627f484b0a — Marius Bakke 8 years ago ffeeda6
gnu: qemu: Update to 2.10.0.

* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10664.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10806.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10911.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-11334.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-11434.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-12809.patch:
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8112.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8309.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8379.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8380.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-9524.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Adjust accordingly.
* gnu/packages/virtualization.scm (qemu): Update to 2.10.0.
[source](patches): Remove.
14 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1020 deletions(-)

M gnu/local.mk
D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10664.patch
D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10806.patch
D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10911.patch
D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-11334.patch
D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-11434.patch
D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-12809.patch
D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch
D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8112.patch
D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8309.patch
D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8379.patch
D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8380.patch
D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-9524.patch
M gnu/packages/virtualization.scm
M gnu/local.mk => gnu/local.mk +0 -12
@@ 971,18 971,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA =						\
  %D%/packages/patches/python2-pygobject-2-gi-info-type-error-domain.patch \
  %D%/packages/patches/python-pygpgme-fix-pinentry-tests.patch	\
  %D%/packages/patches/python2-subprocess32-disable-input-test.patch	\
  %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch			\
  %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8112.patch			\
  %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8309.patch			\
  %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8379.patch			\
  %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8380.patch			\
  %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-9524.patch			\
  %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10664.patch		\
  %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10806.patch		\
  %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10911.patch		\
  %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-11334.patch		\
  %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-11434.patch		\
  %D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-12809.patch		\
  %D%/packages/patches/qt4-ldflags.patch			\
  %D%/packages/patches/qtscript-disable-tests.patch		\
  %D%/packages/patches/quagga-reproducible-build.patch          \

D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10664.patch => gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10664.patch +0 -27
@@ 1,27 0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-10664:

https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2017-06/msg02693.html
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1466190
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-10664
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-10664

Patch copied from upstream source repository:

https://git.qemu.org/gitweb.cgi?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=041e32b8d9d076980b4e35317c0339e57ab888f1

diff --git a/qemu-nbd.c b/qemu-nbd.c
index 9464a0461c..4dd3fd4732 100644
--- a/qemu-nbd.c
+++ b/qemu-nbd.c
@@ -581,6 +581,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
     sa_sigterm.sa_handler = termsig_handler;
     sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa_sigterm, NULL);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX
+    signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+#endif
+
     module_call_init(MODULE_INIT_TRACE);
     qcrypto_init(&error_fatal);
 


D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10806.patch => gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10806.patch +0 -38
@@ 1,38 0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-10806:

https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2017-05/msg03087.html
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1468496
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-10806
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-10806

Patch copied from upstream source repository:

https://git.qemu.org/gitweb.cgi?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=bd4a683505b27adc1ac809f71e918e58573d851d

diff --git a/hw/usb/redirect.c b/hw/usb/redirect.c
index b001a27f05..ad5ef783a6 100644
--- a/hw/usb/redirect.c
+++ b/hw/usb/redirect.c
@@ -229,21 +229,10 @@ static void usbredir_log(void *priv, int level, const char *msg)
 static void usbredir_log_data(USBRedirDevice *dev, const char *desc,
     const uint8_t *data, int len)
 {
-    int i, j, n;
-
     if (dev->debug < usbredirparser_debug_data) {
         return;
     }
-
-    for (i = 0; i < len; i += j) {
-        char buf[128];
-
-        n = sprintf(buf, "%s", desc);
-        for (j = 0; j < 8 && i + j < len; j++) {
-            n += sprintf(buf + n, " %02X", data[i + j]);
-        }
-        error_report("%s", buf);
-    }
+    qemu_hexdump((char *)data, stderr, desc, len);
 }
 
 /*

D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10911.patch => gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-10911.patch +0 -106
@@ 1,106 0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-10911:

https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-216.html
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-10911
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-10911

Patch copied from Xen Security Advisory:

https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/xsa216-qemuu.patch

--- a/hw/block/xen_blkif.h
+++ b/hw/block/xen_blkif.h
@@ -14,9 +14,6 @@
 struct blkif_common_request {
     char dummy;
 };
-struct blkif_common_response {
-    char dummy;
-};
 
 /* i386 protocol version */
 #pragma pack(push, 4)
@@ -36,13 +33,7 @@ struct blkif_x86_32_request_discard {
     blkif_sector_t sector_number;    /* start sector idx on disk (r/w only)  */
     uint64_t       nr_sectors;       /* # of contiguous sectors to discard   */
 };
-struct blkif_x86_32_response {
-    uint64_t        id;              /* copied from request */
-    uint8_t         operation;       /* copied from request */
-    int16_t         status;          /* BLKIF_RSP_???       */
-};
 typedef struct blkif_x86_32_request blkif_x86_32_request_t;
-typedef struct blkif_x86_32_response blkif_x86_32_response_t;
 #pragma pack(pop)
 
 /* x86_64 protocol version */
@@ -62,20 +53,14 @@ struct blkif_x86_64_request_discard {
     blkif_sector_t sector_number;    /* start sector idx on disk (r/w only)  */
     uint64_t       nr_sectors;       /* # of contiguous sectors to discard   */
 };
-struct blkif_x86_64_response {
-    uint64_t       __attribute__((__aligned__(8))) id;
-    uint8_t         operation;       /* copied from request */
-    int16_t         status;          /* BLKIF_RSP_???       */
-};
 typedef struct blkif_x86_64_request blkif_x86_64_request_t;
-typedef struct blkif_x86_64_response blkif_x86_64_response_t;
 
 DEFINE_RING_TYPES(blkif_common, struct blkif_common_request,
-                  struct blkif_common_response);
+                  struct blkif_response);
 DEFINE_RING_TYPES(blkif_x86_32, struct blkif_x86_32_request,
-                  struct blkif_x86_32_response);
+                  struct blkif_response QEMU_PACKED);
 DEFINE_RING_TYPES(blkif_x86_64, struct blkif_x86_64_request,
-                  struct blkif_x86_64_response);
+                  struct blkif_response);
 
 union blkif_back_rings {
     blkif_back_ring_t        native;
--- a/hw/block/xen_disk.c
+++ b/hw/block/xen_disk.c
@@ -769,31 +769,30 @@ static int blk_send_response_one(struct
     struct XenBlkDev  *blkdev = ioreq->blkdev;
     int               send_notify   = 0;
     int               have_requests = 0;
-    blkif_response_t  resp;
-    void              *dst;
-
-    resp.id        = ioreq->req.id;
-    resp.operation = ioreq->req.operation;
-    resp.status    = ioreq->status;
+    blkif_response_t  *resp;
 
     /* Place on the response ring for the relevant domain. */
     switch (blkdev->protocol) {
     case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_NATIVE:
-        dst = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.native, blkdev->rings.native.rsp_prod_pvt);
+        resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.native,
+                                 blkdev->rings.native.rsp_prod_pvt);
         break;
     case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_X86_32:
-        dst = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.x86_32_part,
-                                blkdev->rings.x86_32_part.rsp_prod_pvt);
+        resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.x86_32_part,
+                                 blkdev->rings.x86_32_part.rsp_prod_pvt);
         break;
     case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_X86_64:
-        dst = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.x86_64_part,
-                                blkdev->rings.x86_64_part.rsp_prod_pvt);
+        resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&blkdev->rings.x86_64_part,
+                                 blkdev->rings.x86_64_part.rsp_prod_pvt);
         break;
     default:
-        dst = NULL;
         return 0;
     }
-    memcpy(dst, &resp, sizeof(resp));
+
+    resp->id        = ioreq->req.id;
+    resp->operation = ioreq->req.operation;
+    resp->status    = ioreq->status;
+
     blkdev->rings.common.rsp_prod_pvt++;
 
     RING_PUSH_RESPONSES_AND_CHECK_NOTIFY(&blkdev->rings.common, send_notify);

D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-11334.patch => gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-11334.patch +0 -52
@@ 1,52 0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-11334:

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1471638
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-11334

Patch copied from upstream source repository:

http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=04bf2526ce87f21b32c9acba1c5518708c243ad0

From 04bf2526ce87f21b32c9acba1c5518708c243ad0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 18:08:40 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] exec: use qemu_ram_ptr_length to access guest ram

When accessing guest's ram block during DMA operation, use
'qemu_ram_ptr_length' to get ram block pointer. It ensures
that DMA operation of given length is possible; And avoids
any OOB memory access situations.

Reported-by: Alex <broscutamaker@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Message-Id: <20170712123840.29328-1-ppandit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 exec.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/exec.c b/exec.c
index a083ff89ad..ad103ce483 100644
--- a/exec.c
+++ b/exec.c
@@ -2929,7 +2929,7 @@ static MemTxResult address_space_write_continue(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
             }
         } else {
             /* RAM case */
-            ptr = qemu_map_ram_ptr(mr->ram_block, addr1);
+            ptr = qemu_ram_ptr_length(mr->ram_block, addr1, &l);
             memcpy(ptr, buf, l);
             invalidate_and_set_dirty(mr, addr1, l);
         }
@@ -3020,7 +3020,7 @@ MemTxResult address_space_read_continue(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
             }
         } else {
             /* RAM case */
-            ptr = qemu_map_ram_ptr(mr->ram_block, addr1);
+            ptr = qemu_ram_ptr_length(mr->ram_block, addr1, &l);
             memcpy(buf, ptr, l);
         }
 
-- 
2.13.3


D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-11434.patch => gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-11434.patch +0 -25
@@ 1,25 0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-11434:

https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2017-07/msg05001.html
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1472611
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-11434
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-11434

Patch copied from upstream source repository:

https://git.qemu.org/gitweb.cgi?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=413d463f43fbc4dd3a601e80a5724aa384a265a0

diff --git a/slirp/bootp.c b/slirp/bootp.c
index 5a4646c182..5dd1a415b5 100644
--- a/slirp/bootp.c
+++ b/slirp/bootp.c
@@ -123,6 +123,9 @@ static void dhcp_decode(const struct bootp_t *bp, int *pmsg_type,
             if (p >= p_end)
                 break;
             len = *p++;
+            if (p + len > p_end) {
+                break;
+            }
             DPRINTF("dhcp: tag=%d len=%d\n", tag, len);
 
             switch(tag) {

D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-12809.patch => gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-12809.patch +0 -38
@@ 1,38 0,0 @@
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/08/21/2
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2017-08/msg01850.html

The block backend changed in a way that flushing empty CDROM drives now
crashes.  Amend IDE to avoid doing so until the root problem can be
addressed for 2.11.

Original patch by John Snow <address@hidden>.

Reported-by: Kieron Shorrock <address@hidden>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <address@hidden>
---
 hw/ide/core.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/hw/ide/core.c b/hw/ide/core.c
index 0b48b64d3a..bea39536b0 100644
--- a/hw/ide/core.c
+++ b/hw/ide/core.c
@@ -1063,7 +1063,15 @@ static void ide_flush_cache(IDEState *s)
     s->status |= BUSY_STAT;
     ide_set_retry(s);
     block_acct_start(blk_get_stats(s->blk), &s->acct, 0, BLOCK_ACCT_FLUSH);
-    s->pio_aiocb = blk_aio_flush(s->blk, ide_flush_cb, s);
+
+    if (blk_bs(s->blk)) {
+        s->pio_aiocb = blk_aio_flush(s->blk, ide_flush_cb, s);
+    } else {
+        /* XXX blk_aio_flush() crashes when blk_bs(blk) is NULL, remove this
+         * temporary workaround when blk_aio_*() functions handle NULL blk_bs.
+         */
+        ide_flush_cb(s, 0);
+    }
 }
      
 static void ide_cfata_metadata_inquiry(IDEState *s)
-- 
2.13.3

D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch => gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch +0 -182
@@ 1,182 0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-7493:

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7493

Patch copied from upstream source repository:

http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=7a95434e0ca8a037fd8aa1a2e2461f92585eb77b

From 7a95434e0ca8a037fd8aa1a2e2461f92585eb77b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 14:48:08 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] 9pfs: local: forbid client access to metadata (CVE-2017-7493)

When using the mapped-file security mode, we shouldn't let the client mess
with the metadata. The current code already tries to hide the metadata dir
from the client by skipping it in local_readdir(). But the client can still
access or modify it through several other operations. This can be used to
escalate privileges in the guest.

Affected backend operations are:
- local_mknod()
- local_mkdir()
- local_open2()
- local_symlink()
- local_link()
- local_unlinkat()
- local_renameat()
- local_rename()
- local_name_to_path()

Other operations are safe because they are only passed a fid path, which
is computed internally in local_name_to_path().

This patch converts all the functions listed above to fail and return
EINVAL when being passed the name of the metadata dir. This may look
like a poor choice for errno, but there's no such thing as an illegal
path name on Linux and I could not think of anything better.

This fixes CVE-2017-7493.

Reported-by: Leo Gaspard <leo@gaspard.io>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
---
 hw/9pfs/9p-local.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
index f3ebca4f7a..a2486566af 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-local.c
@@ -452,6 +452,11 @@ static off_t local_telldir(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs)
     return telldir(fs->dir.stream);
 }
 
+static bool local_is_mapped_file_metadata(FsContext *fs_ctx, const char *name)
+{
+    return !strcmp(name, VIRTFS_META_DIR);
+}
+
 static struct dirent *local_readdir(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs)
 {
     struct dirent *entry;
@@ -465,8 +470,8 @@ again:
     if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED) {
         entry->d_type = DT_UNKNOWN;
     } else if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE) {
-        if (!strcmp(entry->d_name, VIRTFS_META_DIR)) {
-            /* skp the meta data directory */
+        if (local_is_mapped_file_metadata(ctx, entry->d_name)) {
+            /* skip the meta data directory */
             goto again;
         }
         entry->d_type = DT_UNKNOWN;
@@ -559,6 +564,12 @@ static int local_mknod(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
     int err = -1;
     int dirfd;
 
+    if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
+        local_is_mapped_file_metadata(fs_ctx, name)) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(fs_ctx, dir_path->data);
     if (dirfd == -1) {
         return -1;
@@ -605,6 +616,12 @@ static int local_mkdir(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
     int err = -1;
     int dirfd;
 
+    if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
+        local_is_mapped_file_metadata(fs_ctx, name)) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(fs_ctx, dir_path->data);
     if (dirfd == -1) {
         return -1;
@@ -694,6 +711,12 @@ static int local_open2(FsContext *fs_ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path, const char *name,
     int err = -1;
     int dirfd;
 
+    if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
+        local_is_mapped_file_metadata(fs_ctx, name)) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     /*
      * Mark all the open to not follow symlinks
      */
@@ -752,6 +775,12 @@ static int local_symlink(FsContext *fs_ctx, const char *oldpath,
     int err = -1;
     int dirfd;
 
+    if (fs_ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
+        local_is_mapped_file_metadata(fs_ctx, name)) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(fs_ctx, dir_path->data);
     if (dirfd == -1) {
         return -1;
@@ -826,6 +855,12 @@ static int local_link(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *oldpath,
     int ret = -1;
     int odirfd, ndirfd;
 
+    if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
+        local_is_mapped_file_metadata(ctx, name)) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     odirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, odirpath);
     if (odirfd == -1) {
         goto out;
@@ -1096,6 +1131,12 @@ static int local_lremovexattr(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *fs_path,
 static int local_name_to_path(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
                               const char *name, V9fsPath *target)
 {
+    if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
+        local_is_mapped_file_metadata(ctx, name)) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     if (dir_path) {
         v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s/%s", dir_path->data, name);
     } else if (strcmp(name, "/")) {
@@ -1116,6 +1157,13 @@ static int local_renameat(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *olddir,
     int ret;
     int odirfd, ndirfd;
 
+    if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
+        (local_is_mapped_file_metadata(ctx, old_name) ||
+         local_is_mapped_file_metadata(ctx, new_name))) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     odirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, olddir->data);
     if (odirfd == -1) {
         return -1;
@@ -1206,6 +1254,12 @@ static int local_unlinkat(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *dir,
     int ret;
     int dirfd;
 
+    if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE &&
+        local_is_mapped_file_metadata(ctx, name)) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, dir->data);
     if (dirfd == -1) {
         return -1;
-- 
2.13.0


D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8112.patch => gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8112.patch +0 -41
@@ 1,41 0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-8112:

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-8112

Patch copied from upstream source repository:

http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=f68826989cd4d1217797251339579c57b3c0934e

From f68826989cd4d1217797251339579c57b3c0934e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2017 18:36:23 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] vmw_pvscsi: check message ring page count at initialisation

A guest could set the message ring page count to zero, resulting in
infinite loop. Add check to avoid it.

Reported-by: YY Z <bigbird475958471@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170425130623.3649-1-ppandit@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
index 75575461e2..4a106da856 100644
--- a/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
+++ b/hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ pvscsi_ring_init_msg(PVSCSIRingInfo *m, PVSCSICmdDescSetupMsgRing *ri)
     uint32_t len_log2;
     uint32_t ring_size;
 
-    if (ri->numPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_MSG_RING_MAX_NUM_PAGES) {
+    if (!ri->numPages || ri->numPages > PVSCSI_SETUP_MSG_RING_MAX_NUM_PAGES) {
         return -1;
     }
     ring_size = ri->numPages * PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_MSG_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
-- 
2.13.0


D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8309.patch => gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8309.patch +0 -46
@@ 1,46 0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-8309:

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-8309

Patch copied from upstream source repository:

http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=3268a845f41253fb55852a8429c32b50f36f349a

From 3268a845f41253fb55852a8429c32b50f36f349a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 09:56:12 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] audio: release capture buffers

AUD_add_capture() allocates two buffers which are never released.
Add the missing calls to AUD_del_capture().

Impact: Allows vnc clients to exhaust host memory by repeatedly
starting and stopping audio capture.

Fixes: CVE-2017-8309
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Huawei PSIRT <PSIRT@huawei.com>
Reported-by: "Jiangxin (hunter, SCC)" <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Message-id: 20170428075612.9997-1-kraxel@redhat.com
---
 audio/audio.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/audio/audio.c b/audio/audio.c
index c8898d8422..beafed209b 100644
--- a/audio/audio.c
+++ b/audio/audio.c
@@ -2028,6 +2028,8 @@ void AUD_del_capture (CaptureVoiceOut *cap, void *cb_opaque)
                     sw = sw1;
                 }
                 QLIST_REMOVE (cap, entries);
+                g_free (cap->hw.mix_buf);
+                g_free (cap->buf);
                 g_free (cap);
             }
             return;
-- 
2.13.0


D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8379.patch => gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8379.patch +0 -98
@@ 1,98 0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-8379:

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-8379

Patch copied from upstream source repository:

http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=fa18f36a461984eae50ab957e47ec78dae3c14fc

From fa18f36a461984eae50ab957e47ec78dae3c14fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Apr 2017 10:42:37 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] input: limit kbd queue depth

Apply a limit to the number of items we accept into the keyboard queue.

Impact: Without this limit vnc clients can exhaust host memory by
sending keyboard events faster than qemu feeds them to the guest.

Fixes: CVE-2017-8379
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Huawei PSIRT <PSIRT@huawei.com>
Reported-by: jiangxin1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20170428084237.23960-1-kraxel@redhat.com
---
 ui/input.c | 14 +++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ui/input.c b/ui/input.c
index ed88cda6d6..fb1f404095 100644
--- a/ui/input.c
+++ b/ui/input.c
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ static QTAILQ_HEAD(QemuInputEventQueueHead, QemuInputEventQueue) kbd_queue =
     QTAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(kbd_queue);
 static QEMUTimer *kbd_timer;
 static uint32_t kbd_default_delay_ms = 10;
+static uint32_t queue_count;
+static uint32_t queue_limit = 1024;
 
 QemuInputHandlerState *qemu_input_handler_register(DeviceState *dev,
                                                    QemuInputHandler *handler)
@@ -268,6 +270,7 @@ static void qemu_input_queue_process(void *opaque)
             break;
         }
         QTAILQ_REMOVE(queue, item, node);
+        queue_count--;
         g_free(item);
     }
 }
@@ -282,6 +285,7 @@ static void qemu_input_queue_delay(struct QemuInputEventQueueHead *queue,
     item->delay_ms = delay_ms;
     item->timer = timer;
     QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(queue, item, node);
+    queue_count++;
 
     if (start_timer) {
         timer_mod(item->timer, qemu_clock_get_ms(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL)
@@ -298,6 +302,7 @@ static void qemu_input_queue_event(struct QemuInputEventQueueHead *queue,
     item->src = src;
     item->evt = evt;
     QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(queue, item, node);
+    queue_count++;
 }
 
 static void qemu_input_queue_sync(struct QemuInputEventQueueHead *queue)
@@ -306,6 +311,7 @@ static void qemu_input_queue_sync(struct QemuInputEventQueueHead *queue)
 
     item->type = QEMU_INPUT_QUEUE_SYNC;
     QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(queue, item, node);
+    queue_count++;
 }
 
 void qemu_input_event_send_impl(QemuConsole *src, InputEvent *evt)
@@ -381,7 +387,7 @@ void qemu_input_event_send_key(QemuConsole *src, KeyValue *key, bool down)
         qemu_input_event_send(src, evt);
         qemu_input_event_sync();
         qapi_free_InputEvent(evt);
-    } else {
+    } else if (queue_count < queue_limit) {
         qemu_input_queue_event(&kbd_queue, src, evt);
         qemu_input_queue_sync(&kbd_queue);
     }
@@ -409,8 +415,10 @@ void qemu_input_event_send_key_delay(uint32_t delay_ms)
         kbd_timer = timer_new_ms(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL, qemu_input_queue_process,
                                  &kbd_queue);
     }
-    qemu_input_queue_delay(&kbd_queue, kbd_timer,
-                           delay_ms ? delay_ms : kbd_default_delay_ms);
+    if (queue_count < queue_limit) {
+        qemu_input_queue_delay(&kbd_queue, kbd_timer,
+                               delay_ms ? delay_ms : kbd_default_delay_ms);
+    }
 }
 
 InputEvent *qemu_input_event_new_btn(InputButton btn, bool down)
-- 
2.13.0


D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8380.patch => gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-8380.patch +0 -53
@@ 1,53 0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-8380:

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-8380

Patch copied from upstream source repository:

http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=24dfa9fa2f90a95ac33c7372de4f4f2c8a2c141f

From 24dfa9fa2f90a95ac33c7372de4f4f2c8a2c141f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2017 17:36:34 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] scsi: avoid an off-by-one error in megasas_mmio_write

While reading magic sequence(MFI_SEQ) in megasas_mmio_write,
an off-by-one error could occur as 's->adp_reset' index is not
reset after reading the last sequence.

Reported-by: YY Z <bigbird475958471@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Message-Id: <20170424120634.12268-1-ppandit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 hw/scsi/megasas.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/hw/scsi/megasas.c b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
index 84b8caf901..804122ab05 100644
--- a/hw/scsi/megasas.c
+++ b/hw/scsi/megasas.c
@@ -2138,15 +2138,15 @@ static void megasas_mmio_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
     case MFI_SEQ:
         trace_megasas_mmio_writel("MFI_SEQ", val);
         /* Magic sequence to start ADP reset */
-        if (adp_reset_seq[s->adp_reset] == val) {
-            s->adp_reset++;
+        if (adp_reset_seq[s->adp_reset++] == val) {
+            if (s->adp_reset == 6) {
+                s->adp_reset = 0;
+                s->diag = MFI_DIAG_WRITE_ENABLE;
+            }
         } else {
             s->adp_reset = 0;
             s->diag = 0;
         }
-        if (s->adp_reset == 6) {
-            s->diag = MFI_DIAG_WRITE_ENABLE;
-        }
         break;
     case MFI_DIAG:
         trace_megasas_mmio_writel("MFI_DIAG", val);
-- 
2.13.0


D gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-9524.patch => gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-9524.patch +0 -287
@@ 1,287 0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-9524:

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-9524
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q2/454

Patches copied from upstream source repository:

http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=df8ad9f128c15aa0a0ebc7b24e9a22c9775b67af
http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=0c9390d978cbf61e8f16c9f580fa96b305c43568

From df8ad9f128c15aa0a0ebc7b24e9a22c9775b67af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 26 May 2017 22:04:21 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] nbd: Fully initialize client in case of failed negotiation

If a non-NBD client connects to qemu-nbd, we would end up with
a SIGSEGV in nbd_client_put() because we were trying to
unregister the client's association to the export, even though
we skipped inserting the client into that list.  Easy trigger
in two terminals:

$ qemu-nbd -p 30001 --format=raw file
$ nmap 127.0.0.1 -p 30001

nmap claims that it thinks it connected to a pago-services1
server (which probably means nmap could be updated to learn the
NBD protocol and give a more accurate diagnosis of the open
port - but that's not our problem), then terminates immediately,
so our call to nbd_negotiate() fails.  The fix is to reorder
nbd_co_client_start() to ensure that all initialization occurs
before we ever try talking to a client in nbd_negotiate(), so
that the teardown sequence on negotiation failure doesn't fault
while dereferencing a half-initialized object.

While debugging this, I also noticed that nbd_update_server_watch()
called by nbd_client_closed() was still adding a channel to accept
the next client, even when the state was no longer RUNNING.  That
is fixed by making nbd_can_accept() pay attention to the current
state.

Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1451614

Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170527030421.28366-1-eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 nbd/server.c | 8 +++-----
 qemu-nbd.c   | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
index ee59e5d234..49b55f6ede 100644
--- a/nbd/server.c
+++ b/nbd/server.c
@@ -1358,16 +1358,14 @@ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
 
     if (exp) {
         nbd_export_get(exp);
+        QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&exp->clients, client, next);
     }
+    qemu_co_mutex_init(&client->send_lock);
+
     if (nbd_negotiate(data)) {
         client_close(client);
         goto out;
     }
-    qemu_co_mutex_init(&client->send_lock);
-
-    if (exp) {
-        QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&exp->clients, client, next);
-    }
 
     nbd_client_receive_next_request(client);
 
diff --git a/qemu-nbd.c b/qemu-nbd.c
index f60842fd86..651f85ecc1 100644
--- a/qemu-nbd.c
+++ b/qemu-nbd.c
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ out:
 
 static int nbd_can_accept(void)
 {
-    return nb_fds < shared;
+    return state == RUNNING && nb_fds < shared;
 }
 
 static void nbd_export_closed(NBDExport *exp)
-- 
2.13.1

From 0c9390d978cbf61e8f16c9f580fa96b305c43568 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 17:26:17 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] nbd: Fix regression on resiliency to port scan

Back in qemu 2.5, qemu-nbd was immune to port probes (a transient
server would not quit, regardless of how many probe connections
came and went, until a connection actually negotiated).  But we
broke that in commit ee7d7aa when removing the return value to
nbd_client_new(), although that patch also introduced a bug causing
an assertion failure on a client that fails negotiation.  We then
made it worse during refactoring in commit 1a6245a (a segfault
before we could even assert); the (masked) assertion was cleaned
up in d3780c2 (still in 2.6), and just recently we finally fixed
the segfault ("nbd: Fully intialize client in case of failed
negotiation").  But that still means that ever since we added
TLS support to qemu-nbd, we have been vulnerable to an ill-timed
port-scan being able to cause a denial of service by taking down
qemu-nbd before a real client has a chance to connect.

Since negotiation is now handled asynchronously via coroutines,
we no longer have a synchronous point of return by re-adding a
return value to nbd_client_new().  So this patch instead wires
things up to pass the negotiation status through the close_fn
callback function.

Simple test across two terminals:
$ qemu-nbd -f raw -p 30001 file
$ nmap 127.0.0.1 -p 30001 && \
  qemu-io -c 'r 0 512' -f raw nbd://localhost:30001

Note that this patch does not change what constitutes successful
negotiation (thus, a client must enter transmission phase before
that client can be considered as a reason to terminate the server
when the connection ends).  Perhaps we may want to tweak things
in a later patch to also treat a client that uses NBD_OPT_ABORT
as being a 'successful' negotiation (the client correctly talked
the NBD protocol, and informed us it was not going to use our
export after all), but that's a discussion for another day.

Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1451614

Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170608222617.20376-1-eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 blockdev-nbd.c      |  6 +++++-
 include/block/nbd.h |  2 +-
 nbd/server.c        | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
 qemu-nbd.c          |  4 ++--
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/blockdev-nbd.c b/blockdev-nbd.c
index dd0860f4a6..28f551a7b0 100644
--- a/blockdev-nbd.c
+++ b/blockdev-nbd.c
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ typedef struct NBDServerData {
 
 static NBDServerData *nbd_server;
 
+static void nbd_blockdev_client_closed(NBDClient *client, bool ignored)
+{
+    nbd_client_put(client);
+}
 
 static gboolean nbd_accept(QIOChannel *ioc, GIOCondition condition,
                            gpointer opaque)
@@ -46,7 +50,7 @@ static gboolean nbd_accept(QIOChannel *ioc, GIOCondition condition,
     qio_channel_set_name(QIO_CHANNEL(cioc), "nbd-server");
     nbd_client_new(NULL, cioc,
                    nbd_server->tlscreds, NULL,
-                   nbd_client_put);
+                   nbd_blockdev_client_closed);
     object_unref(OBJECT(cioc));
     return TRUE;
 }
diff --git a/include/block/nbd.h b/include/block/nbd.h
index 416257abca..8fa5ce51f3 100644
--- a/include/block/nbd.h
+++ b/include/block/nbd.h
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ void nbd_client_new(NBDExport *exp,
                     QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
                     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
                     const char *tlsaclname,
-                    void (*close)(NBDClient *));
+                    void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool));
 void nbd_client_get(NBDClient *client);
 void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client);
 
diff --git a/nbd/server.c b/nbd/server.c
index 49b55f6ede..f2b1aa47ce 100644
--- a/nbd/server.c
+++ b/nbd/server.c
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static QTAILQ_HEAD(, NBDExport) exports = QTAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(exports);
 
 struct NBDClient {
     int refcount;
-    void (*close)(NBDClient *client);
+    void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *client, bool negotiated);
 
     bool no_zeroes;
     NBDExport *exp;
@@ -778,7 +778,7 @@ void nbd_client_put(NBDClient *client)
     }
 }
 
-static void client_close(NBDClient *client)
+static void client_close(NBDClient *client, bool negotiated)
 {
     if (client->closing) {
         return;
@@ -793,8 +793,8 @@ static void client_close(NBDClient *client)
                          NULL);
 
     /* Also tell the client, so that they release their reference.  */
-    if (client->close) {
-        client->close(client);
+    if (client->close_fn) {
+        client->close_fn(client, negotiated);
     }
 }
 
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ void nbd_export_close(NBDExport *exp)
 
     nbd_export_get(exp);
     QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(client, &exp->clients, next, next) {
-        client_close(client);
+        client_close(client, true);
     }
     nbd_export_set_name(exp, NULL);
     nbd_export_set_description(exp, NULL);
@@ -1337,7 +1337,7 @@ done:
 
 out:
     nbd_request_put(req);
-    client_close(client);
+    client_close(client, true);
     nbd_client_put(client);
 }
 
@@ -1363,7 +1363,7 @@ static coroutine_fn void nbd_co_client_start(void *opaque)
     qemu_co_mutex_init(&client->send_lock);
 
     if (nbd_negotiate(data)) {
-        client_close(client);
+        client_close(client, false);
         goto out;
     }
 
@@ -1373,11 +1373,17 @@ out:
     g_free(data);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Create a new client listener on the given export @exp, using the
+ * given channel @sioc.  Begin servicing it in a coroutine.  When the
+ * connection closes, call @close_fn with an indication of whether the
+ * client completed negotiation.
+ */
 void nbd_client_new(NBDExport *exp,
                     QIOChannelSocket *sioc,
                     QCryptoTLSCreds *tlscreds,
                     const char *tlsaclname,
-                    void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *))
+                    void (*close_fn)(NBDClient *, bool))
 {
     NBDClient *client;
     NBDClientNewData *data = g_new(NBDClientNewData, 1);
@@ -1394,7 +1400,7 @@ void nbd_client_new(NBDExport *exp,
     object_ref(OBJECT(client->sioc));
     client->ioc = QIO_CHANNEL(sioc);
     object_ref(OBJECT(client->ioc));
-    client->close = close_fn;
+    client->close_fn = close_fn;
 
     data->client = client;
     data->co = qemu_coroutine_create(nbd_co_client_start, data);
diff --git a/qemu-nbd.c b/qemu-nbd.c
index 651f85ecc1..9464a0461c 100644
--- a/qemu-nbd.c
+++ b/qemu-nbd.c
@@ -336,10 +336,10 @@ static void nbd_export_closed(NBDExport *exp)
 
 static void nbd_update_server_watch(void);
 
-static void nbd_client_closed(NBDClient *client)
+static void nbd_client_closed(NBDClient *client, bool negotiated)
 {
     nb_fds--;
-    if (nb_fds == 0 && !persistent && state == RUNNING) {
+    if (negotiated && nb_fds == 0 && !persistent && state == RUNNING) {
         state = TERMINATE;
     }
     nbd_update_server_watch();
-- 
2.13.1


M gnu/packages/virtualization.scm => gnu/packages/virtualization.scm +3 -15
@@ 72,26 72,14 @@
(define-public qemu
  (package
    (name "qemu")
    (version "2.9.0")
    (version "2.10.0")
    (source (origin
             (method url-fetch)
             (uri (string-append "http://wiki.qemu-project.org/download/qemu-"
             (uri (string-append "https://download.qemu.org/qemu-"
                                 version ".tar.xz"))
             (patches (search-patches "qemu-CVE-2017-7493.patch"
                                      "qemu-CVE-2017-8112.patch"
                                      "qemu-CVE-2017-8309.patch"
                                      "qemu-CVE-2017-8379.patch"
                                      "qemu-CVE-2017-8380.patch"
                                      "qemu-CVE-2017-9524.patch"
                                      "qemu-CVE-2017-10664.patch"
                                      "qemu-CVE-2017-10806.patch"
                                      "qemu-CVE-2017-10911.patch"
                                      "qemu-CVE-2017-11334.patch"
                                      "qemu-CVE-2017-11434.patch"
                                      "qemu-CVE-2017-12809.patch"))
             (sha256
              (base32
               "08mhfs0ndbkyqgw7fjaa9vjxf4dinrly656f6hjzvmaz7hzc677h"))))
               "0dgk7zcni41nf1jp84y0m6dk2nb4frnh571m8hkiv0m4hz4imn2m"))))
    (build-system gnu-build-system)
    (arguments
     '(;; Running tests in parallel can occasionally lead to failures, like: